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In order to control the growth of human population it is helpful to understand 
correctly the mechanism of growth, and the first essential step is to investigate 
current interpretations and reject any unscientific explanations. One of such 
popular but questionable interpretations is the concept of the Epoch of 
Malthusian Stagnation. We discuss its origin, narrative and claims. We explain 
why this concept is scientifically unacceptable. This investigation questions also 
the closely-related Demographic Transition Theory, whose essential component 
is the assumed mechanism of Malthusian stagnation for the first stage of growth.  
Introduction2 
Seven groups of trends are now shaping the future of our planet (Nielsen, 2005, 2006, 2007). 
One of them, and the prime mover of the remaining six, is the excessive growth of human 
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population combined with our unique, insatiable drive to consume more than we need to 
support our life.  
The growth of human population is likely to reach a maximum and start to decline, but even 
if it does we cannot be sure that it will not start increasing again to repeat the currently 
experienced runaway process. In fact, close inspection of data (Manning, 2008; US Census 
Bureau, 2013) strongly suggests that such a repeated runaway process is not only possible but 
also probable.  
If we survive, it will be essential for us to learn how to control the growth of human 
population, and we can have a better chance of doing it if we can understand correctly the 
mechanism of growth, if we can identify and understand its driving forces, if we can explain 
why the population was growing so slowly in the distant past and why its pace increased so 
significantly in the last 200 years. It is in our interest to be on guard against accepting 
incorrect ideas and misconceptions about the driving forces of growth because such ideas 
divert our attention from the correct interpretation of the mechanism of growth and from 
finding a successful solution to the key problem of controlling the growth of population.  
One of such misconceptions is the postulate of Malthusian stagnation, the mechanism, which 
is supposed to have controlled the growth of population over thousands of years and creating 
the Epoch of Malthusian Stagnation also known as the Malthusian Regime, the concept, 
which gained surprisingly high popularity even though a much simpler and elegant 
explanation is suggested by the data (Maddison, 2010; Manning, 2008; US Census Bureau, 
2013) and by the yet insufficiently explored evidence that they can be described using 
hyperbolic distributions (Shklovskii, 1962, 2002; von Foerster & Amiot, 1960; von Hoerner, 
1975).  
3 
 
The concept of Malthusian Stagnation gradually evolved into a system of ideas and 
explanations that could be described as a myth because it is based on beliefs and fragments of 
questionable information, all fused together and shaped by a good dose of creative 
imagination, by filling in the gaps and by adding new twists to the already interesting story, 
the story that has been told and retold many times without seriously testing its validity, 
maybe because like many other good stories, this narrative is also too good and too attractive 
to be spoiled by facts.  
This concept is reinforced by subsidiary ideas, postulates, mechanisms and explanations 
invented on the run and expected to be accepted by faith, claims unsupported by a rigorous 
examination of empirical evidence and yet proclaimed with an absolute certainty. Whatever 
is convenient to make the story attractive is promptly invented and stated with confidence. 
We shall discuss a few examples of such ideas and explanations but more can be found easily 
and readily in the relevant and unfortunately abundant literature.  
Two important elements make the concept of the Epoch of Malthusian Stagnation deceptively 
attractive: it is strongly believable and it is over 200 years old. It is believable because the 
growth of human population over thousands of years was indeed slow, so slow that it appears 
to have been stagnant. It is also an old concept because its origin can be traced to Malthus 
(1798).  
The Malthusian theory, as was outlined initially by Malthus (1978), captures the main 
attributes of the epoch of Malthusian stagnation that had characterized most of human 
existence… (Galor, 2005, p. 221) 
The idea of multiple equilibria, or poverty traps, can be retraced back to Malthus 
(Wang, 2005, p. 36).  
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The work of Malthus was the first documented attempt to understand and explain human 
population dynamics. Considering the time it was written, it was a notable achievement, but it 
should have been developed further into a better-structured scientific paradigm. 
The first tentative steps 
Malthus worked under difficult conditions because he did not have access to the vast amount 
of information available to us.  His pioneering work is important because he has pointed out 
to the limits of growth and warned against the danger of the excessive growth of human 
population.  
He imagined that food production is linear but that the growth of human population 
exponential, at least in principle, because according to him it is also controlled and shaped by 
positive and preventive checks. Malthus does not write much about the preventive checks, 
which he imagines only as a prudent postponement of marriage, but he elaborates a little 
more about the positive checks.  
Famine seems to be the last, the most dreadful resource of nature. The power of 
population is so superior to the power in the earth to produce subsistence for man, that 
premature death must in some shape or other visit the human race. The vices of 
mankind are active and able ministers of depopulation. They are the precursors in the 
great army of destruction; and often finish the dreadful work themselves. But should 
they fail in this war of extermination, sickly seasons, epidemics, pestilence, and plague, 
advance in terrific array, and sweep off their thousands and ten thousands. Should 
success be still incomplete, gigantic inevitable famine stalks in the rear, and with one 
mighty blow levels the population with the food of the world.  
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Must it not then be acknowledged by an attentive examiner of the histories of mankind, 
that in every age and in every state in which man has existed, or does now exist.  
That the increase of population is necessarily limited by the means of subsistence.  
That population does invariably increase when the means of subsistence increase. And 
that the superior power of population is repressed, and the actual population kept equal 
to the means of subsistence, by misery and vice? (Malthus, 1798, p. 44. Italics added.). 
The last sentence in this quotation indicates that Malthus understood positive checks in a 
broader sense. His concept includes more than the generally mentioned cataclysmic events 
such as famines, pestilence and wars.   
Through the animal and vegetable kingdoms, nature has scattered the seeds of life 
abroad with the most profuse and liberal hand. She has been comparatively sparing in 
the room and the nourishment necessary to rear them. The germs of existence contained 
in this spot of earth, with ample food, and ample room to expand in, would fill millions 
of worlds in the course of a few thousand years. Necessity, that imperious all pervading 
law of nature, restrains them within the prescribed bounds. The race of plants and the 
race of animals shrink under this great restrictive law. And the race of man cannot, by 
any efforts of reason, escape from it. Among plants and animals its effects are waste of 
seed, sickness, and premature death. Among mankind, misery and vice. The former, 
misery, is an absolutely necessary consequence of it. Vice is a highly probable 
consequence, and we therefore see it abundantly prevail, but it ought not, perhaps, to be 
called an absolutely necessary consequence. The ordeal of virtue is to resist all 
temptation to evil (Malthus, 1798, p. 5. Italics added.). 
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So it appears that by misery Malthus understood all forms of deprivation and by vice the way 
humans respond to misery. He writes, for instance, “the actual distresses of some of the lower 
classes, by which they are disabled from giving the proper food and attention to their 
children, act as a positive check to the natural increase of population” (Malthus, 1978, p. 20. 
Italics added.). He also adds: “the distresses which they suffer from the want of proper and 
sufficient food, from hard labour and unwholesome habitations, must operate as a constant 
check to incipient population” (Malthus, 1978, p. 31. Italics added.). Positive checks include, 
therefore, not only such large demographic catastrophes as famines, pestilence and wars but 
also various forms of adverse living conditions. In order to understand the relation between 
positive checks and the growth of human population we can study not only the effects of 
demographic catastrophes in the past but also the effects of adverse living conditions 
experienced now in many countries.  
Malthus paved the way towards a correct understanding of population dynamics but all his 
claims and explanations should not have been ever accepted without testing them, and we 
now have many ways of doing it. If confirmed and supported by closer examination, we can 
use them. This is the accepted process of scientific investigation. We can check whether the 
population was increasing exponentially. We can check whether food production was 
increasing linearly. We can study the impacts of demographic catastrophes and see whether 
they were shaping the growth of human population. We can study the impacts of harsh living 
conditions on the growth of human population, impacts such as hunger, poverty and 
infectious diseases. What Malthus could not have done because he did not have access to the 
vast empirical evidence available to us, we certainly can do it now. He was opened to 
suggestions and corrections. Referring to himself in the third person he wrote: 
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If he should succeed in drawing the attention of more able men to what he conceives to 
be the principal difficulty in the way to the improvement of society and should, in 
consequence, see this difficulty removed, even in theory, he will gladly retract his 
present opinions and rejoice in a conviction of his error (Malthus, 1798, p. viii. Italics 
added.) 
Scientific research calls for a high level of integrity. Malthus could have only said that he 
would “gladly retract his present opinions” but he went a step further and added that he 
would “rejoice in a conviction of his error,” the declaration revealing his unbiased attitude to 
his own concepts, an example every scientist should follow.  
Malthus is known for suggesting positive and preventive checks but he is not so well known 
for his concept of an efficient replacement mechanism.  
The absolute population at any one period, in proportion to the extent of territory, could 
never be great, on account of the unproductive nature of some of the regions occupied; 
but there appears to have been a most rapid succession of human beings, and as fast as 
some were mowed down by the scythe of war or of famine, others rose in increased 
numbers to supply their place. Among these bold and improvident Barbarians, 
population was probably but little checked, as in modern states, from a fear of future 
difficulties (Malthus, 1798, p. 15. Italics added.).   
So, if we read closely what Malthus wrote we can see that he did not propose just one or two 
mechanisms of growth but three.  
1. Malthusian stagnation mechanism: The spontaneous, growth-suppressing mechanism 
induced by positive checks.  
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2. Malthusian preventive checks mechanism: The voluntary, growth-suppressing 
mechanism controlled by preventive checks. 
3. Malthusian replacement mechanism: The spontaneous, growth-promoting 
mechanism, i.e. the replacement mechanism, acting in the presence of positive checks.      
The Malthusian stagnation mechanism and Malthusian replacement mechanism describe 
diametrically different effects of positive checks, the growth-suppressing and the growth-
stimulating effects. One of these mechanisms must be inapplicable unless we accept the 
implied explanation proposed by Malthus that the second mechanism applies only to 
improvident “Barbarians, brave, robust, and enterprising, inured to hardship, and delighting 
in war” (Malthus, 1978, p.15) while the first mechanism applies to “higher classes” and to 
people whose manners are “pure and simple” (Malthus, 1978, p. 9). 
An alternative and more convincing explanation is that there is no such thing as the 
Malthusian stagnation mechanism. The growth of population is controlled by some kind of a 
steady mechanism, which can be slowed down by purposefully applied preventive checks. 
However, stagnation is impossible because positive checks trigger automatically the 
replacement mechanism, which quickly repairs the damage caused by positive checks.  
It would be hard to prove that the convoluted implied explanation of the two mechanisms of 
growth for two different groups of people is correct but it would be much easier to disprove it 
by studying the growth of population in poor countries where the positive checks are still 
active to see whether the replacement mechanism is also active and whether it is limited only 
to improvident Barbarians delighting in war.  Indeed, rather than focusing entirely on the 
Malthusian stagnation mechanism, which probably does not work, we should also study the 
Malthusian replacement mechanism. We should combine this study with a close examination 
of data (Maddison, 2010; Manning, 2008; US Census Bureau, 2013). We should try to 
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explain why the apparent natural tendency of the growth of population is to follow hyperbolic 
trajectory (Shklovskii, 1962, 2002; von Foerster & Amiot, 1960; von Hoerner, 1975), the 
amazingly simple pathway, suggesting that the assumption of the Malthusian stagnation 
mechanism is irrelevant and inapplicable 
It is interesting that Malthus used arithmetic and geometric progressions to support his 
arguments but it is not certain whether he was familiar with the hyperbolic growth, let alone 
that he appreciated the difference between the hyperbolic and exponential (geometrical) types 
of growth. Even now many people do not know the difference, and as discussed in another 
place (Nielsen, 2013a, 2013b, 2013c) they fall into the trap of the hyperbolic illusion, the 
deception persuading them to accept the concept of the Epoch of Malthusian Stagnation and 
the associated concept of the escape from the mythical Malthusian trap or a similar concept 
of a sudden intensification in the growth of human population (Johnson & Brook, 2011).   
The stagnation 
One would expect that in the course of time, the explanations and ideas put forward by 
Malthus would have been checked by data and if necessarily corrected, but in over 200 years, 
little progress, if any, has been made in this field, and whatever progress has been made, such 
as in showing that the growth of human population is not exponential but hyperbolic and 
remarkably stable (Shklovskii, 1962, 2002; von Foerster & Amiot, 1960; von Hoerner, 1975), 
has been generally ignored. The original ideas of Malthus about the effects of positive checks 
have been adorned by many colourful and attractive descriptions until they evolved into a 
powerful and compelling narrative. If there is any form of stagnation, it is the stagnation in 
the understanding of the human population dynamics.  
The history of population theory can be summarized in three words: pre-Malthusian, 
Malthusian, and post-Malthusian. Hardly ever in intellectual history does one man so 
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dominate a field as does the Reverend Thomas Robert Malthus in demographic theory. 
To paraphrase a quotation attributed to Newton, Malthus’ shoulders must be climbed 
(Thomlinson, 1965, p. 47. Italics in the original text.).  
 …the demographic transition experiences three regimes: the ‘Malthusian Regime,’ the 
‘Post-Malthusian Regime,’ and the ‘Modern Growth Regime.’ Any theory attempts 
(sic) to describe the process of demographic transition must include these three periods 
(Wang, 2005, p. 3. Italics added.).  
Claiming, suggesting or assuming that something must be accepted just because it comes 
from a certain source is not acceptable in science. Any theory can be questioned and even 
should be questioned, and if necessarily corrected or rejected. The sooner it is done the better. 
If Malthus’s shoulders must be climbed it is only for the same reason as climbing the 
shoulders of any giants of human intellect: to see better and further ahead.  
The myth 
According to the concept of the Epoch of Malthusian Stagnation, human population was 
locked in the Malthusian Trap of positive checks for many thousands of years, the trap 
controlling and suppressing growth, the process reflected in fluctuations or random 
oscillations in the size of human population (Galor 2005, 2007; Galor & Moav, 2001; Galor 
& Weil 1999, 2000; Manfredi & Fanti, 2003). The growth was slow, if any, chaotic and 
unpredictable. This narrative reflects closely the descriptions of the first stage of growth 
claimed by the Demographic Transition Theory (Caldwell, 1976, 2006; Casterline, 2003; 
Coale, 1973; Haupt & Kane, 2005; Kirk, 1996; Landry, 1934; Lee, 2003; Lehr, 2009; 
Notestein, 1945; Olshansky & Ault, 1986; Olshansky, Carnes, Rogers, & Smith, 1997, 1998; 
Omran, 1971, 1983, 1998, 2005; Rogers & Hackenberg, 1987; Singha & Zacharia, 1984; 
Thompson, 1929; van de Kaa, 2008; Warf, 2010).  
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While the origin of the concept of stagnation can be traced back to Malthus and linked with 
the well-known Demographic Transition Theory, the term “epoch of Malthusian stagnation” 
was probably first introduced by Galor and Moav (2001) and strongly reinforced by Galor in 
his so-called Unified Growth Theory (Galor, 2004, 2005), the theory producing no verifiable 
distributions and not a single fit to the data. Indeed, in the detailed discussion of this theory 
(Galor, 2005), the discussion containing over one hundred pages of closely-spaced print, 
many complicated formulae, calculations and graphs are presented but not a single graph 
comparing theoretical predictions with the relevant data (Maddison, 2001), the data referred 
to in this document but not used for a direct verification of the discussed theory.  
A broader concept attempting to explain the growth of human population is the idea of the 
existence of three regimes of growth: (1) Malthusian Regime (or Malthusian Epoch), (2) 
Post-Malthusian Regime and (3) Sustained (or Modern) Growth Regime (Galor & Weil, 
1999, 2000; Galor, 2005), the idea contradicted by the close analysis of data (Maddison, 
2001) known to Galor (2005). This proposed sequence of growth and the sequence claimed 
by the Demographic Transition Theory, containing four stages of growth but maybe even five 
(Haupt & Kane, 2005; Olshansky, Carnes, Rogers, & Smith, 1998; Schmid, 1984; van de 
Kaa, 2008), or six stages (Myrskyla, Kohler & Billari, 2009), is too untidy and unappealing. 
Each stage of growth is governed by different sets of forces. (Routinely more than one force 
is assumed for each stage.) In addition, certain specific forces have to be assumed for each 
transition between relevant stages, all this creating a complex explanation of growth, while 
the data (Maddison, 2010; Manning, 2008; US Census Bureau, 2013) and their limited 
analysis (Shklovskii, 1962, 2002; von Foerster & Amiot, 1960; von Hoerner, 1975) suggest a 
simpler mechanism and a better explanation.  
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Rather than moving forward we seem to be moving in circles. Rather than looking for an 
alternative and possibly simpler and more suitable interpretation of the growth of human 
population suggested both by the data and by their limited analysis, the interpretation 
unknown to Malthus, because his work was based on strongly limited information, we seem 
to be trapped by focusing strongly on just one mechanism of growth he has considered, the 
mechanism of stagnation that probably never worked. What is probably simple is made 
complicated and untidy.  
The problem with the explanation of the human population dynamics reminds about the 
problem encountered many years ago with the explanation of the dynamics of celestial 
bodies. Describing the work of mathematicians of his time, Osiander wrote: 
With them it is as though an artist were to gather the hands, feet, head and other 
members from his images from divers models, each part excellently drawn, but not 
related to a single body, and since they in no way match each other, the result would be 
monster rather than man (Copernicus, 1995).3  
During the long-lasting, mythical Epoch of Malthusian Stagnation, birth rates are claimed to 
have been high because new generations were needed to support many tiresome and mundane 
activities such as hunting, gathering, cultivating crops, caring for children and generally for 
coping with harsh living conditions.  
According to Classical economists, and early Neo-Classical economists as well, 
population size was determined by the demand for labor. This was the Law of 
                                                 
3 This quotation comes from a letter written by Andreas Osiander, Lutheran theologian and a friend of 
Copernicus, a letter addressed to the chief editor, Pope Paul III. Osiander argues in favour of the mathematically 
simple and elegant heliocentric system as opposed to the complicated geocentric descriptions. This letter was 
later used as an unsigned introduction to the book De revolutionibus orbium coelestium, and was mistakenly 
attributed to Copernicus.  
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Population which constantly operated behind the seemingly random variations in 
fertility and mortality induced by epidemic, famine, and war (Lee, 1997, p. 1063). 
Claims: 
1. Population size was determined by the demand for labour 
2. This is the Law of Growth 
3. This law has been accepted by Classical and early Neo-Classical economists 
4. There were seemingly random variations in fertility and mortality 
5. Random variations were caused by epidemics, famine and war 
6. This law operated constantly behind these seemingly random variations.    
It is interesting how much is claimed in this single paragraph and it does not matter whether 
Lee agrees with all these claims or just describes them. This quotation represents a typical set 
of questionable claims often encountered in publications related to the concept of the Epoch 
of Malthusian Stagnation. Can we prove them or do we have to take them by faith? 
To prove this “Law of Population” we would have to have data about the demand for labour 
and about the growth of population extending over thousands of years, and we would have to 
prove that there is a correlation between the demand for labour and the size of human 
population, or the birth rates. We cannot prove it because we do not have such data, but we 
can show that the population data (Maddison, 2010; Manning, 2008; US Census Bureau, 
2013) do not display any features that could linked with this “Law of Population.” Was 
human procreation really guided so rationally by the demand for labour or was it prompted 
by more basic and primordial force? There is nothing in the population data to support this 
“Law of Population” and nothing to support the claims of “Classical economist, and early 
Neo-Classical economists as well.”  
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It is easy to accept, without a proof, that there were random variations in the fertility and 
mortality. It would be probably more difficult to expect that there were no variations but we 
have no information about the amplitude of these variations because while we have reliable 
data about the size of human population (Maddison, 2010; Manning, 2008; US Census 
Bureau, 2013) over thousands of years we have no matching data about fertility and 
mortality (birth rates and death rates).  
How can we ever claim that these assumed and imagined random variations were “induced 
by epidemic, famine, and war”? How can we feel safe in taking such a leap of faith? How can 
we expect that such leaps of faith will lead us in the right direction? The only outcome we 
can expect is that they will lead us gradually further away from finding correct answers. 
It should be also noted that the growth of population is not determined by the absolute values 
of birth and death rates but by the difference between these two quantities. This difference 
determines the growth rate. A constant difference (growth rate) produces exponential growth. 
A zero difference produces constant population. However, variable difference (growth rate) 
does not necessarily produce a variable size of the population and we shall investigate this 
issue further in the next publication. Even if the birth and death rates were high and 
fluctuating we cannot automatically claim that they were producing random fluctuations and 
stagnation in the size of human population.  
According to the concept of the Epoch of Malthusian Stagnation, as soon as the population 
started to increase, it was slowed down or significantly reduced by numerous factors 
associated with harsh living conditions.   
During the first [stage of the demographic transition], fertility is assumed to have been 
sufficiently high to allow a population to grow slowly even in the face of a rather high 
level of mortality. However, periodic epidemics of plague, cholera, typhoid and other 
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infectious diseases would in one or two years wipe out the gains made over decades. 
Over long periods of time there would, consequently, be almost no population growth 
at all (van de Kaa, 2008).  
Claims: 
1. During the first stage of the demographic transition fertility and mortality are 
assumed to have been high 
2. Population was growing slowly 
3. Population growth was strongly controlled by periodic epidemics of plague, cholera, 
typhoid and other infectious diseases 
4. Periodic epidemics of plague, cholera, typhoid and other infectious diseases would 
in one or two years wipe out the gains made over decades 
5. Over long periods of time there was no population growth at all 
Van de Kaa describes the first of four stages of growth claimed by the classical Demographic 
Transition Theory, the stage corresponding to the mythical Epoch of Malthusian Stagnation. 
Here we have a vivid description of what was happening so long ago and over a long time, 
not only a vivid description but also an explanation, as if we moved back in time and saw it 
all happening in front of our eyes. However, this account is in direct contradiction with the 
data describing the growth of human population (Maddison, 2010; Manning, 2008; US 
Census Bureau, 2013) because there were never “long periods of time” when there was 
“almost no population growth at all.” It can be easily checked using the data that the growth 
of population, global, regional and even local, was in general following remarkably stable 
trajectories.  
It is both amazing and disturbing that these hypothetical chaotic changes in the growth of 
human population are not only so confidently claimed but also so categorically explained by 
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correlating them with “periodic epidemics of plague, cholera, typhoid and other infectious 
diseases.” It would be hard, or impossible, to demonstrate these correlations: hard because 
one would have to analyse records of all demographic catastrophes and try to isolate the 
impacts caused by “periodic epidemics of plague, cholera, typhoid and other infectious 
diseases;” hard or impossible because it is generally hard or impossible to isolate specific 
causes of death; impossible because population data (Maddison, 2010; Manning, 2008; US 
Census Bureau, 2013) do not show any signs of periodic crashes and recoveries in the growth 
of population. It is impossible to correlated the non-existent features with  “periodic 
epidemics of plague, cholera, typhoid and other infectious diseases.”  Typically for such 
confident claims, if they are not closely scrutinised they might sound attractive and 
convincing, but they have to be accepted by faith. 
We seem to know also so much about the birth and deaths rates, how high they were and how 
they were fluctuating for thousands of years but all these descriptions, pronounced with 
confidence, are based on speculations and conjuncture because we simply do not have the 
relevant data to support these claims. We may consider ourselves fortunate to have fairly 
reliable estimates of the size of human population in the distant past (Maddison, 2010; 
Manning, 2008; US Census Bureau, 2013) but we have no matching data for the birth and 
death rates.  The data for the size of human population do not support the concept of 
stagnation.   
We might feel or think that our descriptions are true; we might wish that they were true, but 
we should test them by empirical evidence. Furthermore, even if we assume that birth and 
death rates were high and strongly fluctuating we cannot automatically claim that such 
fluctuations are reflected in the size of human population. We might feel that they are but we 
would have to prove it. All these speculations about the death and birth rates being high, 
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closely balanced and producing stagnant state of growth are not based on solid scientific 
evidence and on the accepted process of scientific investigation but on leaps of faith 
reinforced by creative imagination.  
We also seem to have so much information about the harsh living conditions in the distant 
past and about their suppressive influence on the growth of human population but we are 
ignoring the contradictory evidence in the third-world countries. If we spent more time on 
investigating empirical evidence rather than on creative writing maybe we could learn 
something useful about human population dynamics.  
 …the food-controlled homeostatic equilibrium had prevailed since time immemorial” 
(Komlos, 2000, p. 320).  
…the population tends to oscillate in a homeostatic mechanism resulting from the 
conflict between the population's natural tendency to increase and the limitations 
imposed by the availability of food (Artzrouni & Komlos, 1985, p. 24). 
Claims: 
1. There was a food-controlled homeostatic equilibrium 
2. This equilibrium prevailed since time immemorial 
3. Population tends to oscillate in a homeostatic mechanism 
4. Oscillations are caused by the natural tendency of the population to increase and by 
the limitations imposed by the availability of food 
There is nothing to stop anyone from assuming homeostatic mechanism for the growth of 
human population but to claim that “homeostatic equilibrium had prevailed since time 
immemorial” we would have to work a little harder. We would have to design a model with 
the homeostatic equilibrium and show that it fits the relevant data “since time immemorial,” 
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but even then we would have to allow for the possibility that some other mechanism could 
also fit the data equally well or maybe even better. Life would be too easy if we could just 
imagine that something happened and claim that it did happen. We have no convincing 
evidence that there was homeostatic equilibrium between the supply of food and the size of 
human population let alone that “food-controlled homeostatic equilibrium had prevailed since 
time immemorial.”  
Artzrouni and Komlos (1985) claim that “the population tends to oscillate in a homeostatic 
mechanism.” Such oscillations add an extra degree of difficulty in reconciling the theory with 
the data. The oscillations should be produced by the model but even more importantly they 
should be also demonstrated in the relevant data.  
Population data (Maddison, 2010; Manning, 2008; US Census Bureau, 2013) show no signs 
of such oscillations.  Furthermore, if we examine closely the results of the calculations based 
on this “homeostatic mechanism” we shall see that Artzrouni and Komlos (1985) generated a 
steadily-increasing exponential growth with no signs of any oscillations and that their 
calculated distribution does not fit the population data.  
The absence of the desired oscillations or stagnation and the disagreement with the data show 
that the assumed mechanism of Malthusian stagnation does not work. The claim that “the 
population tends to oscillate in a homeostatic mechanism” is neither confirmed by the data 
nor by the model, which assumes the presence of such oscillations.        
Stage 1 [of the Demographic Transition Theory] presumably characterizing most of 
human history, involves high and relatively equal birth and death rates and little 
resulting population growth” (Guest & Almgren, 2001; p. 621. Italics added.).  
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This stage is characterized not by changes in average death rates but by a stagnation of 
death rates at extremely high levels for a period of what is believed to be thousands of 
years” (Olshansky & Ault, 1986, p. 357. Italics added.). 
Claims: 
1. Stage 1 of the demographic transition presumably characterised most of human 
history 
2. During this stage 1 there were high and relatively equal birth and death rates 
3. During this stage there was little resulting population growth 
4. This stage was not characterised by changes in the average death rates 
5. This stage was characterised by stagnation of death rates at extremely high 
levels 
6. This stagnation is believed to have lasted for thousands of years 
It is amazing how many details we know or believe to know and how well we understand 
what was happening over thousands of years without having strong empirical evidence to 
support all these claimed details.   
Birth and death rates may have been high and strongly fluctuating but it does not matter. 
High and fluctuating birth and death rates do not necessarily prove the existence of a stagnant 
state of growth because, as mentioned earlier, growth is determined by the average difference 
between these two quantities. (We shall examine this issue more closely in the next 
publication.) Even more importantly, studying just the death rates or birth rates, or 
equivalently studying just the fertility rates (Lehr, 2009) cannot be used as the evidence of 
stagnation or of the demographic transitions because if for instant the average fertility rates 
decrease in the same way as the average mortality rates, if the gap between them is 
approximately constant or gradually increasing, they will not produce any form of transition 
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in the growth of population or any form of stagnation but rather a steady and undisturbed 
growth.  
To generate a stagnant state we would have to have fertility and mortality rates changing in a 
very special way. The average difference between them could not be constant or increasing 
but it should be zero. While we cannot investigate the long-range time-dependence of the 
birth and death rates because we do not have the relevant data, we can study the time-
dependence of the size of the population and these data do not confirm the existence of any 
form of stagnation, let alone stagnation that lasted for thousands of years.   
It is well documented that the fluctuations experienced by the world’s population 
throughout history did not have a regular, cyclical pattern, but were, to a large extent, 
brought about by randomly determined demographic crises (wars, famines, epidemics, 
etc.). As McKeown and others have pointed out, the main cause of these fluctuations of 
the past were mortality crises. There are four kinds of crises: subsistence crises, 
epidemic crises, combined crises (subsistence/epidemic), and finally crises from other 
causes, which are mainly exogenous (wars, natural or other catastrophes)  
Crises followed by periods of population decline during which the nutritional status of 
the population improved gave rise to fluctuations which testify to the continued 
existence of the ‘Malthusian trap’: population would not grow beyond its carrying 
capacity for long, and when it did, the resulting overshoot was followed by a ‘crash’ 
(i.e. the positive checks such as diseases, famines, wars, etc.) (Artzrouni & Komlos 
1985, p. 24. Italics added.). 
Claims: 
1. There were fluctuations in the world’s population throughout history 
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2. These fluctuations are well documented 
3. It is well documented that these fluctuations did not have a cyclic pattern 
4. It is well documented that these fluctuations were, to a large extent, brought 
about by randomly determined demographic crises (wars, famines, epidemics, 
etc.) 
5. The main cause of these fluctuations were mortality crises 
6. There are four types of crises 
7. Crises were followed by periods of population decline 
8. Population decline improved nutritional status 
9. Fluctuations testify to the continuing existence of Malthusian trap 
10. Population was repeatedly reaching its carrying capacity 
11. Population would not grow beyond its carrying capacity for long  
12. Population growing beyond its carrying capacity was reflected in overshoots 
13. Overshoots were followed by crashes.  
If it is so well-documented it would be interesting to see at least a few references to this 
important and fundamental research work, to see the data for these fluctuations “throughout 
history,” to see a positive proof that the “the fluctuations experienced by the world’s 
population throughout history” are correlated with “demographic crises (wars, famines, 
epidemics, etc.),” that they were “brought about by randomly determined demographic 
crises.” It would be also interesting to see convincing evidence that population was reaching 
its carrying capacity, that “population would not grow beyond its carrying capacity for long,” 
the convincing evidence of overshoots and crashes, evidence that crashes were associated 
with “positive checks such as diseases, famines, wars, etc.,” the compelling evidence of the 
existence of Malthusian trap, the demonstration of “periods of population decline,” the 
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compelling proof that periods of population decline caused by demographic crises were 
improving nutritional status.  
It is well documented (Maddison, 2010; Manning, 2008; US Census Bureau, 2013) that the 
growth of human population does not show fluctuations or random behaviour. It is well 
documented that the data show no signs of frequent overshoots and crashes, no signs of 
growth reaching its carrying capacity, no signs of the “continued existence of the ‘Malthusian 
trap’,” no evidence that the “population would not grow beyond its carrying capacity for 
long,” and no “periods of population decline.” All these colourful and dramatic descriptions 
associated with the narrative of the mythical Epoch of Malthusian Stagnation are not 
confirmed by the population data.  
It is obvious, that demographic crises were often causing decline in the size of local 
populations, depending on their scale and depending on what we understand by a local crisis. 
Sometimes it might have been just a large death toll in a city, a part of a country, as for 
instance in China (Mallory, 1926), or maybe in the whole country or even extending over a 
few countries. However, a large death toll does not necessarily mean a significant impact on 
the growth of human population. A large death toll should not be immediately interpreted as a 
population decline; it could have been just a slower growth over a certain time. All these 
issues should be closely investigated by examining records of demographic catastrophes. To 
arrive at any reasonably supported conclusion we would have to do some work. However, we 
have no data showing that these local demographic crises were repeatedly causing 
fluctuations in the growth of regional or global populations. In fact, the data show remarkably 
stable growth of human population, unaffected by demographic crises.             
The opening statement in the above quotation contains two interesting and characteristic 
elements, the elements occurring repeatedly in the descriptions of the concept of the Epoch of 
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Malthusian Stagnation: (1) it makes a highly-questionable but confident declaration about the 
existence of certain features (in this case about the existence of fluctuations) and (2) it equally 
confidently explains them while ignoring empirical evidence. The normal progression is first 
to observe certain features and then try to explain them. We can also reverse the process: we 
can first predict the existence of certain features. However, to accept the prediction and the 
associated explanation, we would have to demonstrate the existence of the predicted features.  
So in this case, we would have to show first that there were significant fluctuations in the 
birth and death rates or in the size of human population and then we would also have to 
explain them convincingly by demonstrating that they were correlated with demographic 
crises. Alternatively, we would have to predict (using a suitable mathematical model) 
fluctuations in birth and death rates or in the size of human population by assuming that they 
are correlated with demographic crises and then we would have to show that our prediction is 
confirmed by the relevant data.    
We cannot prove that there were fluctuations “throughout history” in the birth and death rates 
because we do not have the relevant data, but we can prove that there were no fluctuations 
“throughout history” in the size of human population because we have the relevant data 
(Maddison, 2010; Manning, 2008; US Census Bureau, 2013). There is nothing here to 
explain, except perhaps to explain the absence of fluctuations, the absence of random 
behaviour, crashes, overshoots or “periods of population decline.”     
Referring to three sources (Habakkuk, 1953; Kunitz, 1983; McKeown, 1983), Komlos 
explains:  
Malthusian positive checks (mortality crises) maintained a long-run equilibrium 
between population size and the food supply. Crises followed by periods when human 
nutritional status was above the level of subsistence gave rise to cycles. …the cycles 
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testify to the continued existence of the ‘Malthusian population trap’: population could 
not grow beyond an upper bound imposed by the resource and capital constraints of 
the economic structure in which it was imbedded. The ‘escape’ from this trap occurred 
only when the aggregate capital stock was large enough and grew fast enough to 
provide additional sustenance for the population, which thereby overcame the effects of 
the diminishing returns that had hindered human progress during the previous 
millennia. After escaping from the Malthusian trap, population was able to grow 
unchecked.  In historic terms, this escape corresponds to the industrial and demographic 
revolutions. Removal of the nutritional constraint, at least for the developed part of the 
world, resulted in the population explosion (Komlos, 1989, pp. 194, 195. Italics 
added.).  
Claims: 
1. There was a long-term equilibrium between population size and the food supply 
2. This equilibrium was maintained by positive checks (mortality crises) 
3. Crises were followed by periods when human nutritional status was above the 
level of subsistence 
4. This process gave rise to cycles 
5. The cycles testify to the continued existence of the ‘Malthusian population trap’ 
6. Population could not grow beyond an upper bound imposed by the resource and 
capital constraints of the economic structure in which it was imbedded 
7. Malthusian trap was active for millennia 
8. The escape for the Malthusian trap occurred when the aggregate capital stock 
was large enough and grew fast enough to provide additional sustenance for the 
population 
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Massive amount of work would be required to support all these impressive declarations. We 
would have to study food supply over millennia and determine how they were correlated with 
the growth of human population. We would have to prove that there was “a long-run 
equilibrium between population size and the food supply.” We would have to study mortality 
crises over millennia. We would have to establish a correlation between the growth of human 
population, food supply and mortality crises. We would also have to investigate upper bounds 
of “resource and capital constraints” and prove that over millennia the size of the population 
was repeatedly reaching the limits of these upper bounds. It is easy to declare so much so 
quickly and with such a confidence, but it is harder to prove it. It is also hard to accept it, but 
accept we must if we want to accept the concept of the Epoch of Malthusian Stagnation.     
The cycles cannot possibly testify to “the continued existence of the ‘Malthusian population 
trap’” because they did not exist. Judging from the context, the reference here is to the cycles 
in the size of human population. There are no signs of cycles in the population data 
(Maddison, 2010; Manning, 2008; US Census Bureau, 2013). The absence of cycles and the 
steady growth of human population testify that the Malthusian trap did not exist. We cannot 
also claim that there was “‘escape’ from this trap” because there was no trap. 
If the cycles refer to the mortality rates, it is even worse because we do not have the relevant 
data extending over millennia to claim that they “testify to the continued existence of the 
‘Malthusian population trap’.” 
Discussing the first stage of the Demographic Transition Theory, Warf explains:   
Because both fertility and mortality rates are high, the difference between them — 
natural population growth — is relatively low, fluctuating around zero” (Warf, 2010, p. 
708. Italics added.).  
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Claims: 
1. During the first stage of the demographic transition fertility and mortality rates 
were high. 
2. Natural population growth (growth rate) was fluctuating around zero 
In this quotation the “natural population growth” is identified as the difference between the 
fertility and mortality rates, i.e. as the growth rate. We shall recall that while the growth rate 
fluctuating around a constant value describes exponential growth, the growth rate “fluctuating 
around zero’ describes the constant size of the growing entity, that is in our case, the constant 
size of the population. The claim made by Warf is contradicted by data, which show that for 
thousands of years the size of human population was increasing. The “natural population 
growth” (growth rate) could not have been “fluctuating around zero.” Furthermore, two time-
dependent quantities do not have to be large to make the difference between them small and 
fluctuating around zero, so the cause-effect relation is also incorrectly identified.   
In line with the accepted interpretations of the first stage of the Demographic Transition, 
Lagerlöf writes:  
The Malthusian Regime in our model is a stable situation where death and birth rates 
are both high, and population roughly constant. Moreover, mortality is highly volatile, 
increasing dramatically in periods of big epidemic shocks. In periods with mild shocks 
population expands. This worsens the impact of the next epidemic, equilibrating 
population back to its Malthusian state (Lagerlöf, 2003a, p. 756. Italics added).  
In our model, the world can thus be stuck in a Malthusian equilibrium for centuries and 
then suddenly escape, and never contract back. As suggested by a referee, this process 
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could possibly be interpreted in terms of wars, instead of epidemics (Lagerlöf, 2003a, p. 
766. Italics added.).  
Throughout human history, epidemics, wars and famines have shaped the growth path 
of population. Such shocks to mortality are the central theme of the model set up by 
Lagerlöf, which endogenously generates a long phase of stagnant population and living 
standards, followed by an industrial revolution and a demographic transition (Lagerlöf, 
2003b, pp. 434, 435. Italics added.).  
Claims: 
1. It is assumed that there was a Malthusian regime 
2. It is assumed that Malthusian regime is characterised by high birth and death 
rates 
3. During the Malthusian regime population is roughly constant 
4. Mortality is highly volatile 
5. Mortality increases dramatically in periods of big epidemic shocks 
6. Population expands when the mortality shocks are mild 
7. Expanding population worsens the impact of the next epidemic and equilibrates 
population to the Malthusian state 
8. Malthusian equilibrium lasts for centuries 
9. The process of Malthusian equilibrium can be also explained by wars instead of 
epidemics 
10. Throughout human history, epidemics, wars and famines have shaped the 
growth path of population. 
11. Model based on the assumption of shocks to mortality generates a long phase of 
stagnant population 
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It would be interesting to see convincing support for all these claims. In order to study the 
impact of demographic crises on the growth of human population we have three options: (1) 
to carry out an extensive survey of recorded demographic crises and see whether they are in 
any way correlated with changes in the data representing the growth of human population; (2) 
to carry out an extensive survey of recorded demographic crises, incorporate them in a 
mathematical model and see whether the model generates significant changes in the 
calculated size of human population and whether the model-predicted distributions of the size 
of the population fit the empirical data; and (3) to incorporate random fluctuations in birth 
and death rates in a suitably designed model, without worrying whether they are in any way 
related to the recorded incidents of demographic catastrophes and see whether model-
generated distributions for the size of the population show any fluctuations or clearly uneven 
variations and whether these distributions fit the relevant data.  
Lagerlöf carried out a limited model-based study of the effects of random fluctuations by 
assuming them only for the death rates. Close examination of his results shows that they are 
in contradiction with his conclusions about the existence of the Epoch of Malthusian 
Stagnation and that they fail to fit the relevant population data.  
It appears that Lagerlöf interpreted the roughly constant growth rate as the roughly constant 
population. When we look at the results of his Monte Carlo calculations (Lagerlöf, 2003b, p. 
436) carried out using the model described in his companion publication (Lagerlöf, 2003a) 
we can see that he displays roughly constant growth rates generated by his model but 
interprets them as population growth.   
As already mentioned earlier, roughly constant growth rates produce exponential growth. 
They do not produce roughly constant population. Thus, rather than showing that the 
population was roughly constant, fluctuating and stagnant, Lagerlöf has shown that his model 
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generated exponential growth of population, which is definitely not stagnant. Paradoxically, 
therefore, Lagerlöf has shown that if we assume that the growth of population is controlled by 
random forces, we shall not produce a stagnant state with a roughly constant size of the 
population but a steady, non-stagnant, exponential growth. It is interesting that under similar 
conditions but using a different approach for their computer simulations, Artzrouni and 
Komlos (1985) also did not generate stagnation but a steady exponential growth of human 
population.  
Lagerlöf as well as Artzrouni and Komlos were on the verge of making a breakthrough 
discovery. Had they carried out their research properly, had they adhered to the principles of 
impartial and unbiased scientific investigation, they would have discovered that the 
assumption of the existence of Malthusian oscillations resulted in producing a steadily 
increasing size of human population without any signs of oscillations or fluctuations. They 
would have discovered that their models strongly question the whole concept of Malthusian 
stagnation and that perhaps all these positive checks proposed by Malthus do not have such a 
profound effect on the growth of human population as feared by him and as accepted by so 
many people who do not seem to question his original suggestions and expectations.  
However, results of Lagerlöf as well as of Artzrouni and Komlos also show that while 
producing exponential growth, as expected by Malthus, the generated distributions do not fit 
the data. This is another interesting and important clue. Perhaps Malthus was not correct in 
assuming that the population if unchecked increases exponentially. Perhaps he would have 
suggested something different if he had access to all the data so easily available to us. 
Perhaps we do not have to accept blindly and reverently all his concepts. Perhaps they are not 
immune to the process of scientific investigation; particularly that Malthus never expected or 
wanted to have such an unassailable immunity for his concepts. 
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It is hard to understand why Lagerlöf did not compare results of his model calculations with 
the data describing the growth of human population because he had access to the relevant 
data (Maddison, 2001). It was such an essential and important step to take but for whatever 
reason it was not taken.  
 In our model, this leads to a constant rate of population growth prior to the adoption of 
the Solow technology. This result is consistent with population data from Michael 
Kremer (1993), where the growth rate of population fluctuates around a small constant 
throughout most of the Malthusian period (from 4000 B.C. to A.D. 1650)” Hansen & 
Prescott” (2002, p. 1205. Italics added.).  
Claims: 
1. Growth rate of population was constant during the Malthusian regime (i.e. prior to the 
adoption of Solow technology) 
2. Constant growth rate is consistent with population data from Michael Kremer (1933) 
3. Kremer’s data show that the growth rate of population fluctuates around a small 
constant throughout most of the Malthusian period  
First, as mentioned earlier, constant growth rate should not be confused with constant 
population. Constant growth rate produces exponential growth. 
Second, we would have to show convincingly that the growth rate was indeed fluctuating 
around a small constant value. Kremer (1963) did not carry out an extensive study of the 
growth rate but his limited investigation shows that it was not constant and that it was not 
fluctuating, but that it was increasing approximately linearly with the size of the population. 
Hansen and Prescott must have seen these results because Kremer presents them in a graph, 
which is impossible to miss, and yet for some unexplained reason they did not use them. 
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The regularity noticed by Kremer is in perfect agreement with the evidence of the hyperbolic 
growth (Shklovskii, 1962, 2002; von Foerster & Amiot, 1960; von Hoerner, 1975). This 
combined evidence deserves further investigation but it strongly suggests that the growth rate 
was probably never fluctuating around a constant value.    
It might not be immediately obvious but this short declaration that “the growth rate of 
population fluctuates around a small constant throughout most of the Malthusian period” 
contains a huge amount of questionable information. We would have to do a lot of hard work 
to be able to say so much, so categorically and with such a confidence.   
We would have to prove convincingly that the Malthusian period existed. Such a proof, on its 
own, would have been a monumental achievement deserving a special recognition. We would 
then have to study the behaviour of the growth rate during that period, preferably going back 
to the dawn of our existence some 200,000 or 300,000 years ago and show convincingly that 
sometimes the growth rate was not fluctuating around a constant value but most of the time it 
did.   
Such leaps of faith, such confident but strongly questionable declarations, such claims 
containing so much unproven assertions occur repeatedly in the descriptions of the concept of 
the Epoch of Malthusian Stagnation. When accepted by faith, they can be easily reinforced by 
other dubious concepts, one wrong step followed by another, leading to an increasing 
accumulation of incorrect ideas, to the development of a system based on misconceptions, to 
the narratives, which might be interesting and fascinating but leading away from discovering 
correct interpretations.  
 If population density increases the mortality rate rises, equilibrating population back to 
the Malthusian trap (Lagerlöf, 2003a, p. 765. Italics added.).  
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Here we have an example of an interesting detail in the concept of the Epoch of Malthusian 
Stagnation, the detail containing huge amount of information. This statement introduces the 
concept of the dependence of mortality rates on the density of human population. It offers an 
explanation of the mechanism of the Malthusian trap, whose existence is not supported by the 
population data. It describes some kind of a general rule stating that the Malthusian trap is 
activated when the population density, not its size, reaches a certain limiting value.  
There is no research confirming the described mechanism; no research showing how the 
growth of human population depends on its density. Even if we could show some isolated 
examples of density-dependent growth we would have to demonstrate that they apply to 
regional and global populations. The best data available to us show the time-dependence of 
the size of human population and there is nothing in them to suggest any form of density-
dependence, let alone the existence of the Malthusian trap.  
This statement is yet another example of the leaps of faith, of confident declarations requiring 
a huge amount of work to be accepted as a reliable contribution to science. The descriptions 
of the Epoch of Malthusian Stagnation are full of such unscientific declarations. Indeed, they 
are made of them.       
Other terms used to describe the alleged stagnant and fluctuating state of growth during this 
mythical Epoch of Malthusian Stagnation are “equilibrium trap” or “population trap” 
(Leibenstein, 1957; Nelson, 1956), “multiple equilibria” or “poverty trap” (Wang, 2005).  
The belief in the stagnant and fluctuating growth is so strong that mathematical models are 
deemed successful if they can generate the desired oscillations during this mythical Epoch of 
Malthusian Stagnation, and no-one seems to care about taking the next and the most essential 
step to compare model calculations with the population data (Galor, 2005; Galor & Weil, 
2000; Lagerlöf, 2003a, 2003b). As long as oscillations of some kind are generated by a 
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mathematical model, they are taken as the proof of the existence of the Epoch of Malthusian 
Stagnation. This line of reasoning shows that the primary, if not the exclusive, aim of such 
mathematical exercises is to translate a story into a mathematical language and when the 
translation is done correctly, when mathematical formulae generate any kind of oscillations, 
large or small, significant or negligible, these formulae are taken as a proof that the myth 
represents reality.    
The Epoch of Malthusian Stagnation is also described as the Age of Pestilence and Famine 
(Omran 1971, 1983, 1986, 1998).  
In this stage, the major determinants of death are the Malthusian positive checks, 
namely epidemics, famines and wars (Omran, 1983, p. 306; Omran, 2005, p. 737).   
Even if fertility approached its biologic maximum, depopulation could and did occur as 
a result of epidemics, wars and famines, which repeatedly pushed mortality levels to 
high peaks (Omran, 2005, p. 733).  
Claims: 
1. During the Age of Pestilence and Famine (Epoch of Malthusian Stagnation) major 
determinants of death are the Malthusian positive checks (epidemics, famines and 
wars) 
2. Depopulation was occurring even when fertility was approaching its biological 
maximum because epidemics, wars and famines were repeatedly pushing mortality 
levels to high peaks 
To justify the first claim we would have to have reliable records of the causes of death over 
thousands of years.  We would then have to show convincingly that indeed the major causes 
of death were epidemics, famines and wars. We would also have to show that there was a 
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clear change in the causes of death when the Epoch of Malthusian Stagnation ceased to exist. 
We cannot present such proofs because we do not have the supporting data. 
To justify the second claim we would have to have reliable records of fertility and mortality 
over thousands of years. We would then have to demonstrate that fertility was approaching 
biological limits, that such events were coinciding with high mortality peaks and that these 
high mortality peaks were caused by epidemics, wars and famines.  
 During the first stage, mortality vacillated at high levels, with infectious disease as the 
main cause of death plus a large proportion due to wars and famines (Robine, 2001, p. 
191. Italics added.).  
Claims: 
1. During the first stage of demographic transitions mortality vacillated at high levels 
2. The main causes of death were infectious diseases 
3. Large proportion of death were caused by wars and famines   
We cannot prove that “mortality vacillated at high levels” because we have no relevant data 
for “the first stage” to carry out such a study, the stage that is assumed to have lasted for 
thousands of years. We cannot prove that these imagined and strongly-desired vacillations 
were correlated with infectious disease, wars and famines. We cannot prove that the main 
causes of deaths were infectious diseases. We cannot prove that a large proportion of death 
was due to wars and famines. We do not have records of causes of death extending over 
thousands of years. We do not know how the causes of death were changing over time. We 
do not have the records to help us to distinguish between the major cause and secondary 
causes. We do not know whether the main cause of death was the same over thousands of 
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years. In order to accept the concept of the Epoch of Malthusian Stagntion and all these 
claims have to be accepted by faith.  
The first transition phase, called the ‘Age of Pestilence and Famine,’ is characterized by 
high and fluctuating mortality rates, variable life expectancy with low average life 
span, and periods of population growth that are not sustained (McKeown, 2009, p. 
20S. Italics added.).  
Claims: 
1. During the Age of Pestilence and Famine (Epoch of Malthusian Stagnation) 
mortality rates were high and fluctuating 
2. Average life span was low 
3. There were periods when the population growth was not sustained 
Mortality rates might have been high and fluctuating but we have no data extending over 
thousands of years to prove it. Furthermore, we would yet have to show that these 
hypothetical high and fluctuating mortality rates could have been responsible for creating 
stagnation. The same applies to the low average life span. As for the “periods of population 
growth that are not sustained” we can easily demonstrate using the population data that this 
claim is not sustained.  
The positive forces of growth had existed all along. However, they had been 
counterbalanced by the negative forces of malnutrition and disease (Komlos & Baten, 
2003, p. 19).  
We have no reliable empirical evidence to support this claim, no study of positive and 
negative forces, no study of their balancing, and no study of their influence on the growth of 
human population. There is also no attempt to consult the population data (Maddison, 2010; 
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Manning, 2008; US Census Bureau, 2013) to test the concept of the balancing of positive and 
negative forces. Here again, and quite typically, an attractive declaration fitting the generally 
accepted concept is made without trying to support it by solid scientific evidence.  
Summary and conclusions 
We have given a few examples of unsubstantiated claims associated with the concept of the 
Epoch of Malthusian Stagnation, examples of confident declarations, which have to be 
accepted by faith.  They represent only a part of a wider range of misconceptions about the 
growth of human population and about the related issue of the economic progress as 
expressed in terms of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) or the GDP per capita.  
It is impossible to correct the mistakes of the past 200 years in just one short article but we 
have mentioned a few ways of testing and correcting the prevailing misconceptions. In the 
next few articles we shall focus on some of these ways.  
A huge step forward can be made if we identify and abandon incorrect concepts no matter 
how popular and how attractive they might appear to be. However, each impartial and 
unbiased examination of empirical evidence can also take us a step closer to a better and 
correct understanding of the human population dynamics and of the economic progress.   
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